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that argument, some preliminary points need to be made in order to provide the relevant context. The first set of points are about the status of realism in the period, the second about the status of language.
When Voloshinov wrote that metaphors entailed a regrouping of values, he was not excluding their capacity to draw attention to the 'literariness' of the text. For Voloshinov, this was not a matter of either values or literariness, but two ways of referring to the same thing. Indeed, like Jakobson, Voloshinov wanted a relative and contextually resonant view of metaphor and other tropes.6 Unlike Jakobson, however, he insisted on the basically social structure of language. Necessarily Voloshinov adopted a position vis-a-vis contemporary Realist aesthetics when he stressed that discourse did not reflect a 'nonverbal situation as a mirror reflects an object'.7 Indeed, criticism of reflection theory was a strategy characteristic also of Constructivist practice. Figurative realism persisted throughout the revolutionary reorganization and early twenties, and was a consistent presence well before Socialist Realism was imposed as official Soviet cultural policy in the early thirties.8 As such it was the constant complement and underside of all avant-garde activity.
A pre-requisite for geometric abstraction was a belief in the value of the resistance of art to narrative, to literature, and consequently to figurative realism as it had developed in Russia during the latter part of the nineteenth century.9 By the twenties, interpretations of conventional Realist aesthetics ranged from the vulgar Marxist view of art as an unmediated window onto the world to more subtle formulations of the mirror theory of art as reflection which acknowledged the mediating aspects of art. Some of the crudest versions of the idea of figurative art as the mere reflection of reality had been marshalled by the avant-garde itself in defence of the cause of artistic autonomy. Rozanova, for example, had discussed the art of the past as mere imitation in 1913:
inconsistent, but pragmatic, position to take which enabled a clear-cut affirmation of Futurist art by contrast. The opposition was stark, as David Burliuk put it:
Today we do have art. Yesterday it was the means, today it has become the end. Painting has begun to pursue only Painterly objectives. It has begun to live for itself.11
According to this avant-garde model, representation tended to be confused with resemblance.12 Yet it is clear from the constant insistence on 'painterly objectives' as exclusive of representation, that the notion of autonomy itself was conceptually interlocked with that which it set out to negate-figurative realism as it had developed from the nineteenth century.
In fact, the inheritance of Realist practice and criticism was far more substantial than the parody suggests. It was a tradition in criticism which allowed for latent meanings to surface, revealing more than the conscious mind intended. This was the tradition taken up by Lukacs, which derived from nineteenth-century Realist aesthetics. Dobrolyubov's 'magic mirror' reflected the world of social and class development.13 Engels took Balzac to be the greatest master of realism on the grounds that 'his truthful reproduction of typical characters under typical circumstances' compelled him to represent the world in a way that went against his own class sympathies.14 Lenin pursued the same line of argument in the article that he wrote on Tolstoy in 1908:
That Tolstoy, owing to these contradictions, could not possibly understand either the working-class movement and its role in the struggle for socialism, or the Russian revolution, goes without saying. But the contradictions in Tolstoy's views and doctrines are not accidental; they express the contradictory conditions of Russian life in the last third of the nineteenth century ... From this point of view, the contradictions in Tolstoy's views are indeed a mirror of those contradictory conditions in which the peasantry had to play their historical part in our revolution. 15 Here was the idea that the mirror could show more than the author could knowingly articulate, revealing real conditions through the breadth of detail. For Lukacs later, as well as for the nineteenth-century Realist critics, the desired effect was an image of the totality of social relations. This was to be achieved through the portrayal of representative social and class types.
When it came to applying this type of criticism after the revolution to a contemporary, rather than to a past culture, its critical aspects were for the most part shed in favour of a fairly crude insistence on intentionality. 'Contradiction' gave way to celebration of the new soviet types. However, there were those, like Trotsky, who insisted on the mediating properties of art whilst continuing to use the image of the mirror. For Trotsky, the mirror was an agency of reconstruction-not passive but active. 'Of course', he wrote in Literature and Revolution in 1923, 'no one speaks of an exact mirror', but 'To reject art as a means of picturing and imaging knowledge because of one's opposition to the contemplative and impressionistic art of the past few decades, is to strike from the hands of the class which is building a new society its most important weapon'.16 Yet Trotsky was in agreement with the Realist position that works without 'subject matter' gave up their capacity to communicate. It was in opposition to the view that this capacity resided solely in subject and motif, and that art reflected society, that Russian Constructivism developed.
Both Lenin and Trotsky insisted upon the problematic character of the period of transition, which would ultimately lead to Communism. However, the Realist position taken by the AKhRR group in the twenties refused to allow for such conflict to be enacted in art.17 Yevgeny Katsman's use of an illusionistic technique in Listening (Members of the Communist Faction from the Village of Baranovka) (Fig. 1) , demonstrates an acceptance of the authority of nineteenth-century modes of representation. The AKhRR group assumed that there could be such a thing as a 'truthful' picture, and that 'truth' was pictured by a skilled, academic and photographic rendering. Despite claims for the compatibility of figurative realism to the period and its increasing legitimation by the Party,18 its refusal of the contradictory and the uncertain made it no real correlate for the period of transition: that problematic was expressed in Constructivism, not simply by rejecting the category of 'art'-for that step was not nearly so simple as it has often been taken to be-but just because of the difficulties of signification, of the shifting, unstable character of the works produced. 19 In order to make sense as avant-garde practices, both Futurism and Constructivism opposed and negated the strategies associated with Realism. To claim that the work of the avant-garde was as a consequence conceptually interlocked with what it negated opens Constructivism to a whole field of reference previously denied to it. This axis of Constructivism-Realism was one of a series of antinomies with which the avant-garde worked-and it provided the base-line, as it were, for other associations and inferences to work from. That is to say that the works did not simply negate, but signified, and it is what was signified, and how, that is at issue here.20 So how, without the appearance of subject matter, might reference and association operate? 'Reference' is here taken to indicate both a process of pointing to and also of carrying associations.
Kristeva has discussed the 'aura of systematics' that prevailed at the time of the inception of modern linguistics (and, as she claims, in which linguistics is still bathed).21 Russian Constructivism was pervaded with the same aura which she identifies in Russian Formalist literary criticism and linguistic analysis. At the heart of the programme of the First Working Group of Constructivists, set up in 1921, was the apparently objective analysis of a systematic practice. The basic system would consist of a set of principles-scientific principles-which could, once established, be applied in the production of useful goods. In the 'First Programme of the Working Group of Constructivists', produced in March 1921, the three central tenets of Constructivist production were claimed to be tectonics, faktura and construction-that is, structuring, handling, and organizing material. The aim was to achieve 'the communistic expression of material structures' and a synthesis between the 'ideological aspect with the formal'.22 The intentions of the Constructivists and their context within avant-garde circles have been well documented elsewhere, in particular by Christina Lodder.23 The problem addressed here is how a belief in such principles could have come to be held.
The Constructivists thought that principles could be established that would enable the systematic structuring of properties. As a procedure, this was adapted from the earlier definition of properties peculiar to painting. Accordingly, it followed that Realism should have been identified as that which allowed the intrusion of properties alien to painting such as narrative. Narratives, which told tales of social, sexual, and other mores, were seen as the cuckoo in art's nest.24 Indeed, one of the key points made in support of geometric abstraction in the 1910s had been its status as the antithesis of language; consequently art had gained its autonomy because literary and other referential concerns had been dispelled from it. The resistance to language was all-important-yet this idea of an imperviousness to language developed amidst a set of debates about language as a paradigmatic system. Art was, in an important sense, seen to be like language because it functioned systematically-and its analysis could be scientific just as linguistic analysis was. Language provided a model as a system, not as a means of 'thinking in images' or as a vehicle for narrative. 25 In art as in language, the system was believed to be made up of component parts. In art those components were elements in a formal 'language'-a language that was modelled on verbal language. These elements were the subject of practical demonstration in Constructivist works. As Popova wrote in connection with the 5 X 5 = 25 exhibition, held at (Fig. 3) . Faktura or the density of surface, on the other hand, was under scrutiny in the Black on Black series (Fig. 4) . with more mystical ends in view, had represented the system of devices which constituted art in a series of endless permutations of forms in static, in dynamic, in lateral and in literal relationships with one another.28 For Malevich's Suprematist works to be perceived as art required a familiarity with the idea that the system of art was of a geometrical order (an idea that could be traced to the academic classical tradition) and that a function of art could be to lay that system bare. As such, the square of The Black Square and its permutations were represented as part of a system and, moreover, as part of a system that was analogous to that of verbal language. Planes, lines and surfaces came to be seen to be like the verbal 'material' of language and to correspond to the devices in language which rendered that material 'artful'. This blurring of the distinction between material as the 'stuff of art and as the device or process was a characteristic of the practice of art: the square for Malevich or the line for Rodchenko were both the raw material and a basic device of art. The concept of 'raw material' was an aspect of Futurism that was developed by the Formalists. Jakobson was consistent in his treatment of the material of literature as its verbal texture-as that which made up its 'literariness'.29 Shklovsky, on the other hand, was at times rather ambiguous about what actually constituted 'material'-he referred sometimes to the material provided by the experience of the world and sometimes to the technical materials at the disposal of writers.30 The material which most concerned him, though, was the material of prosaic or everyday language, that was 'made strange' and therefore artful through the use THE OXFORD ARTJOURNAL -12:1 1989 of poetic devices. It was this process which triggered the necessary poetic effect of defamiliarization or deflection from reality.31
The point here is not to find direct equivalences between art and language theory, but rather to point to their problematic relation. For it soon becomes clear that the task of specifying equivalent devices in art and in literature, words for colours and such like, is a ludicrous one. Rather, the analogy was general enough to be effective and endowed the system of art with a 'grammar' and a 'syntax' of its own. In art, the 'system' was seen to be in opposition to realist and figurative art. In Formalist literary criticism, on the other hand, the Realist literary tradition of the nineteenth century was deemed just as suitable for analysis as the sort of Futurist poetry which loudly celebrated its own autonomy.32 Shklovsky, for example, treated narrative description as a literary device in his study of Dickens' Little Dorrt, which appeared in LEF in 1924. Descriptive passages were treated as a device to slow down the plot.33 Art critics such as Punin and Tarabukin, who worked within a broadly Formalist critical framework, never tackled the Realist tradition in visual art in this way, but defined modern painting by virtue of its difference to the traditional form; in Tarabukin's words, its difference to 'the "literary story" which usually prevailed over form in traditional canvases'.34
The search for the features which differentiated art from narrative, art from the whole spectrum of its 'others', focused on one key distinction: construction and composition. A series of debates were conducted at INKhUK (Institute of Artistic Culture) during the spring of 1921.35 Because this distinction was so insecure, it is revealing. The debates show how the terms cut across contemporary discourse, working through analogy and metaphor; how their binary opposition defined the relative properties of each; how that definition was anything but secure or fixed. There was an awareness of the difficulties involved in categorizing the process of art in this way; for example, Rodchenko was fairly tentative when he commented, 'in my works, there is not yet pure construction, instead there is constructive composition'.36 Differences of opinion emerged during the discussion at a meeting at INKhUK on 22 April 1921. Some-notably members of the First Working Group of Constructivists-believed that construction must be related to three-dimensional objects and not to the two-dimensional realm of painting, and that construction must be closely related to utilitarian work in production. Others believed that construction was not tied to a utilitarian purpose but was essentially an organizing artistic device. Without conceding that construction was purely aesthetic, Rodchenko evidently believed that a little confusion was a necessary, if not necessarily desirable, part of the transition to construction proper.
For those committed to utilitarian purpose, a distinction was made between 'construction', as an organizing principle and the kind of aesthetic function which accorded with the retrogressive notion of the 'composition'. It is this distinction that Medunetsky tried to demonstrate in the drawings Construction ( The scheme of a construction is the combination of lines, and the planes and forms which they define; it is a system of forces.
Composition is an arrangement according to a defined and conventional signification.39
Construction, then, was seen, as 'effective organization' as opposed to 'arrangement'; it was a 'system' which, we can deduce, is not subject to 'a defined and conventional signification'. And signification might, but need not, refer to figuration; or the conventional meaning attached to the composition might be, not figurative reference, but that of the art object and the 'purely aesthetic' interests attributable to it. This could be interpreted to mean, of course, that construction does not depend on signification or meaning-conventional or otherwise. This distinction between system and signification, as if they were exclusive objectives, is belied by dependence of the 'constructions' on reference and association-to three-dimensional constructions, to technical drawing and so forth. This set of associations can provide a frame of reference for Medunetsky's construction; for it is not inherently more systematic than other possible formulations, yet it drew on a contemporary currency of meanings to signify technical construction. The idea of the system itself had been signified through the underlying reference to the realm of language theory, to questions of what language is. Now this can be seen to be overlaid by the dual possibilities within the system of art: composition or construction. So individual parts are represented as if part of a system, which may be a system of composition or, more appropriately, of construction. In construction, the parts are represented as scientific, as governed by objective principles: 'constructiveness' is integral to the artefacts only in so far as it is signified.
The network of discourses allowing these works to be seen as constructions rather than as compositions, or indeed as absurdly failed technical drawings, also allied the constructions with other social systems, notably those of science and industrial production. In the reconstruction of social life after 1917, these had changed radically and, in the limited context of this discussion, it is possible to identify a shift in the primary fields of reference-from systems of language and language theory to a situation where these, still residual, were overlaid with other, more urgent metaphors. The connotations of the term 'construction' changed accordingly. Like faktura, the term 'constructive', which formed the root of the term Constructivism, had originally entered the Russian language from the French. Its specific application to art in this instance derived from its use in French Cubist theory, with which the Russians were familiar. As in the French, the meaning of the word 'konstruksiya' ranged through building to grammatical construction.40
In the early 1910s, the Russian avant-garde was using the term 'constructive' to refer to the surface of Cubo-Futurist works.41 After 1917, the term accrued connotations of the social role of the artist as that of a constructor and an engineer. This move has been well documented elsewhere and Christina Lodder has noted the first probable use of the term in 1918 by Osip Brik, who wrote that the artist was 'now only a constructor and technician, only a supervisor and a foreman'.42 It is interesting to note that here the label 'constructor' is only one of a string of epithets, but the one which evidently caught hold (might foremanism have captured hearts in different circumstances?). This elision with other terms, the sliding scale of imagery, suggests a clustering of associations that was really far less specific than is often suggested. Far more concrete was the point of principle that art was now to be considered a particular kind of work-production rather than creation-and thus analogous with other kinds of work in industry. This analogy was a pre-requisite for the artist to be seen as a constructor and enabled art to be recognized as a specialist type of work: the constructor was, crucially, a specialist worker.
The acknowledgement of artistic construction as the work of the specialist was itself dependent on the broader concept of the 'bourgeois specialist' addressed by Lenin To trace these shifting and reciprocal allusions and referents is certainly not a matter of looking for the subject matter depicted in Constructivism. For if Constructivist work secures our interest, it is clearly not through resembling that to which it refers. Yet whilst resemblance does not operate here in the way I earlier associated with mimetic art, it perhaps should not be ruled out of court altogether. After all, the idea of an object that literally looks like 'nothing on earth' is inconceivable. Any configuration is vulnerable to a figurative reading; the idea of likeness can emerge even from a collection of straight lines and hatched areas, such as to be found in Popova's Constructivist Composition (Fig. 9) ./ . A relationship with science is established and these works are represented as akin to science. This relationship to science, it can be argued, is metaphorical. The metaphor relies on the invasion of one realm (that of the art work) by another (that of science); this was done by using tools that belonged to science and not, conventionally, to art. Tools conventional to the scientific or technical draughtsman, like the ruler, the compass or the set-square may not be used in order to draw a diagram and the marks produced might be perfectly normal to find in a technical diagram, but are not normal to find in a painting. Beyond serving to draw certain types of line, the tools do not serve the same function in each case. There is no credible way in which Rodchenko's Linear Construction or Popova's Constructivist Composi-.~I.?.... JI tion (Fig. 9) that is to say, with the premium on resemblance; but it is also displaced as the expression of emotion then associated with the 'intuitive' curves and fluidity of, say, a work by Kandinsky. This was a sliding scale of associations and negations which relied on assumed knowledge and which could be understood as common currency by Rodchenko and Popova. It could oscillate between the common-place and the more specialized aspects of art practice. That is, commonplaces could derive from anywhere and be readily available across a wide spectrum, or they could be produced and reproduced more narrowly within avant-garde discourse itself.55
In Rodchenko's Linear Construction (Fig. 2) , the art of painting was not altogether eliminated as a category for conceiving of the work; the category of art was retained in the evidence of faktura in the scumbled ground-and in the areas of brushwork in both the works by Popova (Figs. 9 and 14) . Even in Rodchenko's Non-Objective Painting (Fig. 3) , where there is very little trace of handling left, the character of the work as art necessary to the metaphor still remains; it is sufficient that the object is offered for exhibition-or even that the object is simply hypothetically exhibitable. Because the negotiation of a metaphor involves and requires a familiarity with both that which is displaced and that which is doing the displacing, the terms for negotiation need to be available. If they are not available, then the procedure is simply meaningless, as indeed it was to many contemporary commentators who were situated outside the avant-garde community.
The point here is that the identity of 'art' has to have some kind of residual presence for the mechanism of metaphor to operate meaningfully. What happens, then, when there seems to be no active presence of the category in Constructivist design? When it seems to be eliminated altogether? For instance, the series of textile designs by Popova and illustrated in LEF (Fig. 15) no longer appear to retain the subject 'art' for alien realms to come into conflict with. Osip Brik was insistent that these designs were not determined 'by abstract, aesthetic considerations' but by economic purpose.56 The functional was opposed to the decorative. However, the implications of these two terms hovered around the category 'art'. Rather than the decorative belonging to art, and the functional not, both properties were signified rather than inherent in art. 'Functionalism' was itself a category signified-just Fig. 16 ). Yet they have the capacity to appear as rational and efficient solutions, a capacity which required the lingering reference to the geometric 'vocabulary' of forms developed by the avant-garde in art, and thus to the stock of metaphorical meanings that reference entailed. This claim for the on-going role of the mechanism of metaphor in Constructivist work in production is not intended to restore utilitarian design to a purely aesthetic category. Instead it is meant to draw attention to the difficulties and to the ambivalence of the works, for the transition into production was far from straightforward. The science metaphor demonstrates at once the claims for scientific status and the subversion of its own claimed scientificity.58 The result was a multiplicity of references. For, like the idea of construction, the 'scientific' cut through various realms. Amongst these, Formalist criticism was believed to be a scientific system; so was Marxism.
It was the belief in a scientific theory and practice which united the different groups within the LEF, The metaphor of science cut across discourses, and with it were carried layers of further inference. Foremost amongst the terms understood, as it were, in parallel to it, were 'material' and 'materialism'. The term 'material' was crucial in the Constructivist effort to develop a practice compatible with Marxism. Osip Brik, for example, used the term to describe raw material in the Formalist sense, to refer to the basic organization of colour and form within Rodchenko's productive work; he also referred to a 'material culture' in the sense of design, that would revolutionize taste for the proletariat, the future consumer; 'material culture' meant work in production, and thus was used in a Marxist sense to describe the economic position of the producer within the prevailing relations of production. 
